SUMMARY The likelihood-ratio based score level fusion (LR-based fusion) scheme has attracted much attention, since it maximizes accuracy if a log-likelihood ratio (LLR) is accurately estimated. In reality, it can happen that a user cannot input some query samples due to temporary physical conditions such as injuries and illness. It can also happen that some modalities tend to cause false rejection (i.e. the user is a "goat" for these modalities). The LR-based fusion scheme can handle these situations by setting LLRs corresponding to missing query samples to 0. In this paper, we refer to such a mode as a "modality selection mode", and address an issue of accuracy in this mode. Specifically, we provide the following contributions: (1) We firstly propose a "modality selection attack", in which an impostor inputs only query samples whose LLRs are more than 0 (i.e. takes an optimal strategy) to impersonate others. We also show that the impostor can perform this attack against the SPRT (Sequential Probability Ratio Test)-based fusion scheme, which is an extension of the LR-based fusion scheme to a sequential fusion scenario. (2) We secondly consider the case when both genuine users and impostors take this optimal strategy, and show that the overall accuracy in this case is "worse" than the case when they input all query samples. More specifically, we prove that the KL (KullbackLeibler) divergence between a genuine distribution of integrated scores and an impostor's one, which can be compared with password entropy, is smaller in the former case. We also show to what extent the KL divergence losses for each modality. (3) We finally evaluate to what extent the overall accuracy becomes worse using the NIST BSSR1 Set 2 and Set 3 datasets, and discuss directions of multibiometric applications based on the experimental results.
Introduction
Biometric authentication, which recognizes a user based on his/her physical traits (e.g. fingerprint, face, iris) or behavioral characteristics (e.g. voice, gait), is widely used for various kinds of applications such as physical access control, computer login, and ATM banking systems. Since biometrics is not forgotten unlike passwords and is much harder to steal than smart cards, it can provide a more convenient and secure way of authentication. A biometric authentication system recognizes a user based on a score (similarity or distance) between his/her biometric sample presented at Manuscript received October 6, 2015. Manuscript revised January 26, 2016 . † The author is with the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Tokyo, 135-0064 Japan.
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a) E-mail: takao-murakami@aist.go.jp DOI: 10.1587/transfun.E99.A.929 the authentication phase (referred to as a query sample) and a biometric template enrolled in advance. For example, the system computes the percentage of matched minutia pairs [2] or the Euclidean distance between two eigenfaces [3] as a score, and decides whether the user is genuine or not by comparing the score to a pre-determined threshold.
Recognition accuracy is one of the most important characteristics in the biometric system. To achieve satisfactory level of accuracy, a large number of multibiometric fusion schemes, which combine multiple sources of biometric information (e.g. fingerprint, face, and voice), have been widely studied in the literature [4] . According to the type of information sources to be fused, these schemes can be classified into the following categories: sensor level fusion, feature level fusion, score level fusion, and decision level fusion. They combine multiple raw biometric samples, multiple biometric features, multiple scores, and multiple decision results, respectively.
Score level fusion has been especially well studied because of its general applicability; it can be applied to any kind of biometric systems that output scores. For example, most of the commercial biometric systems do not provide access to raw biometric data nor features for proprietary reasons, and both sensor level fusion and feature level fusion cannot be applied to these systems. On the other hand, score level fusion can be applied to these systems if they provide access to scores (for example, a one-to-one matching function in BioAPI [5] , the international standard for the API in biometric systems, outputs a score). Also, score level fusion generally provides much better accuracy than decision level fusion, since scores contain much richer information than decision results.
One of the most promising score level fusion schemes is the likelihood-ratio based score level fusion scheme (referred to as the LR-based fusion scheme) [6] . This scheme computes a log-likelihood ratio (LLR) (or equivalently, a likelihood ratio) based on scores, and compares it to a predetermined threshold (if the LLR is higher than or equal to the threshold, accept the user; otherwise, reject him/her). Since scores are highly independent of each other in the case of multiple modalities (e.g. fingerprint, face, and voice) or multiple instances (e.g. left fingerprint and right fingerprint) [4] , it is often assumed that all scores are independent in this case. Then, the LR-based fusion scheme computes the total LLR by summing up a LLR for each modality (or instance) (as described in Sect. 2.1 in details). The most distinctive feature of this LR-based fusion scheme is the optimality with Copyright © 2016 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers regard to accuracy; the Neyman-Pearson lemma [7] guarantees that this scheme minimizes FAR (False Accept Rate) for a given FRR (False Reject Rate), if the total LLR is accurately estimated.
In reality, it can happen that a user cannot appropriately input query samples for some modalities due to temporary physical conditions such as finger injuries and sore throats. It can also happen for some users that some modalities tend to cause false rejection. In other words, they are goats (those who are particularly difficult to recognize) [8] for these modalities. The LR-based fusion scheme can handle these situations by allowing the user to select modalities in which he/she inputs query samples, and setting the LLRs corresponding to missing query samples to 0 [9] (as described in Sect. 2.2 in details). In this paper, we refer to such a mode as a modality selection mode. This mode provides a usable way of authentication for users who have difficulty (either temporarily or permanently) in inputting query samples with high LLRs for some modalities.
In this paper, we address an issue of accuracy in the LR-based fusion scheme with the modality selection mode, which has not been studied in the literature to our knowledge. First of all, we propose a modality selection attack, in which an impostor (attacker) inputs only query samples whose LLRs are more than 0 to impersonate others. Since the total LLR is maximized in this case, this attack is optimal in that it maximizes FAR among all possible combinations of modalities. The impostor can find such vulnerable modalities by using some background knowledge about the target user's biometrics (e.g. face/voice that is made public, residual fingerprint) or attempting some promising combinations of modalities (see Sects. 4.1 and 4.3 for details).
Then we turn our attention to the fact that genuine users can also take this optimal strategy; they can input only query samples whose LLRs are more than 0 to maximize GAR (Genuine Accept Rate; GAR = 1− FAR). They can find such modalities because they know their own temporary physical conditions (e.g. finger injuries, sore throats), or because they know from experience that some modalities tend to cause false rejection (i.e. they are "goats" for these modalities). That is, this is exactly the motivation of the modality selection mode. Then the following question arises: Is the "overall" accuracy improved by adopting the modality selection mode? From an information-theoretic point of view, we will provide theoretical and experimental evidence that the answer is "no". We will also show "to what extent" the overall accuracy becomes worse, and discuss directions of multibiometric applications based on the results.
Our Contributions
The contributions of this paper, which are common to the previously published conference paper [1] , are as follows:
• We propose a modality selection attack, in which an impostor inputs only query samples whose LLRs are more than 0, as an optimal attack against the LR-based fusion scheme with the modality selection mode (Sect. 4.1).
• We prove that the overall accuracy in the case when both genuine users and impostors take this optimal strategy is "worse" than that in the case when they input all query samples (i.e. when the system does not operate in the modality selection mode). More specifically, we prove that the KL (Kullback-Leibler) divergence between a genuine distribution of integrated scores and an impostor's one [10] , [11] , which can be compared with password entropy [12] , [13] , is smaller in the former case. We also show to what extent the KL divergence losses for each modality (Sect. 5).
• We show that the "overall" performance, which is measured by the DET (Detection Error Tradeoff) curve [14] (i.e. FAR-FRR curve, which can be obtained by plotting FAR against FRR at various thresholds) and the KL divergence, indeed becomes smaller through experimental evaluation. We also show to what extent the KL divergence losses (Sect. 6).
This paper is an extension of the previously published conference paper [1] . The main enhancements are as follows:
• We show that the impostor can perform the modality selection attack against the SPRT (Sequential Probability Ratio Test)-based fusion scheme [15] , which is an extension of the LR-based fusion scheme to a sequential fusion scenario where the system verifies a user each time he/she inputs a query sample (Sect. 4.2).
• We use the generalized k-NN (Nearest Neighbor) estimator [16] to estimate the KL divergence in our experiments, since the estimate converges to the true value as the sample size increases. We show that the estimate indeed converges as the sample size increases by using the NIST BSSR 1 Set 2 and Set 3 datasets [17] , which are large-scale biometric score datasets (Sect. 6).
• Based on the experimental results, we discuss directions of multibiometric applications (Sect. 7).
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 1.3, we introduce basic notations and assumptions in this paper. In Sect. 2, we describe related work on the LR-based fusion scheme [6] , [9] , [18] - [23] and the SPRT-based fusion scheme [15] , [24] - [26] . In Sect. 3, we explain password entropy [12] , [13] and the KL divergence [10] , [11] . In Sect. 4, we propose a modality selection attack against the LR-based fusion scheme and the SPRT-based fusion scheme. In Sect. 5, we prove that the KL divergence becomes smaller by adopting the modality selection mode. In Sect. 6, we report the experimental results. In Sect. 7, we discuss directions of multibiometric applications. Finally, we conclude this paper in Sect. 8.
Notations and Assumptions
In this paper, we focus on a multibiometric authentication system that combines multiple modalities (e.g. fingerprint, face, and voice) or multiple instances (e.g. left fingerprint and right fingerprint) [4] . Let M be the number of modalities (or instances) used in the system. We assume that a score is discrete. Let X be a (discrete) score space, and x (m) ∈ X (1 ≤ m ≤ M) be a score at the m-th modality (or instance) that is computed at the authentication phase. We define the following two hypotheses:
The user is an impostor.
Then we make the following two assumptions:
(i) all scores are independent.
(ii) a score at the m-th modality x (m) is generated from a genuine distribution f
These assumptions are also made in the LR-based fusion scheme in [9] , [18] , [20] . We can say that these assumptions are reasonable in the case of multiple modalities (or multiple instances). Let y (m) ∈ R be a log-likelihood ratio after observing a score x (m) (i.e. LLR at the m-th modality), which is given by
When we prove that the KL divergence becomes smaller by adopting the modality selection mode in Sect. 5, we further make the following assumption:
(iii) a LLR y (m) monotonically increases (or decreases) with a similarity (or distance) x (m) .
Since a score is generally designed so that a genuine probability increases as a similarity (or distance) increases (or decreases), we can say that the assumption (iii) is reasonable. The logistic regression model, whose effectiveness is shown in [26] - [28] , also makes this assumption.
Related Work
In this section, we briefly review related work on the LR-based fusion (likelihood-ratio based score level fusion) scheme and the SPRT (Sequential Probability Ratio Test)-based fusion scheme. We describe the LR-based fusion scheme [6] , the modality selection mode, the SPRT-based fusion scheme [15] , and other studies on LR-based fusion (or SPRT-based fusion) [9] , [18] - [26] in Sects. 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, respectively.
LR-Based Fusion
Nandakumar et al. [6] proposed the LR-based fusion scheme. . The LR-fusion scheme computes the total LLR z (t ot ) by summing up the LLR for each modality (y (1) , y (2) , y (3) ), and compares it to the threshold z t h . The SPRT-based fusion computes z (m) (= ∑ m µ=1 y (µ) ) each time a user inputs a query sample, and compares it to z t h (we show two examples: one results in acceptance after the 2nd input, and the other results in rejection).
In statistics, the Neyman-Pearson lemma [7] states that the likelihood-ratio test, which compares a LLR to a threshold, minimizes the type I error probability for a given type II error probability. The LR-based fusion scheme is based on this lemma, and minimizes FAR for a given FRR if the total LLR is accurately estimated.
We now explain the LR-based fusion scheme in details. Let z (tot) ∈ R be a total LLR after observing all scores x (1) , · · · , x (M ) , which is given by
The LR-based fusion scheme verifies a user by comparing the total LLR z (tot) to a pre-determined threshold z th ∈ R (if z (tot) ≥ z th , accept the user; otherwise, reject him/her). Under the assumptions (i) and (ii) in Sect. 1.3 (which is made in [9] , [18] , [20] ), the total LLR z (tot) can be expressed as a summation of a LLR for each modality:
(recall that the LLR y (m) is given by (3)). The left side of Fig. 1 shows an example of the LR-based fusion scheme (M = 3, z th = 20).
The LLR y (m) can be estimated from a score x (m) using a genuine distribution f (3)). These distributions can be trained, for example, by assuming the GMM (Gaussian Mixture Model) and using the EM (Expectation-Maximization) algorithm as a parameter estimation method [6] . Another way of estimating the LLR y (m) is to directly estimate it from the score x (m) (without training f imp ()). For example, we can use the logistic regression model, which estimates the LLR y (m) as a linear function of the score x (m) . Since many studies [26] - [28] show the effectiveness of the logistic regression model, we also use this model in our experiments in Sect. 6.
Modality Selection Mode
In reality, it can happen that a user cannot appropriately input his/her query samples for some modalities due to temporary physical conditions such as injuries and illness. A user might know from experience that some modalities tend to cause false rejection (i.e. he/she is a goat [8] for these modalities). The LR-based fusion scheme can handle these situations by allowing the user to select modalities in which he/she inputs query samples, and setting the LLRs corresponding to missing query samples to 0 [9] .
This can be easily explained as follows. Let M (sel) ⊆ {1, · · · , M } be a set of indexes for modalities selected by a user, and z (sel) be a total LLR after observing the corresponding query samples. Under the assumptions (i) and (ii) in Sect. 1.3, z (sel) can be expressed as follows:
which is equal to the value obtained by setting the LLRs y (m) corresponding to missing query samples to 0 in (5).
The LR-based fusion scheme with the modality selection mode verifies the user by comparing z (sel) to the threshold z th (if z (sel) ≥ z th , accept; otherwise, reject). In this paper, we assume that the user can attempt authentication without inputting any query sample (i.e. M (sel) = ϕ). For example, he/she can press an "authentication" button without inputting any query sample. Since the total LLR z (sel) is 0 in this case, such a trivial attempt always results in rejection if we set the threshold z th to be more than 0.
SPRT-Based Fusion
A major problem of multibiometric fusion is that it requires a user to input multiple query samples at the authentication phase, which may cause inconvenience to the user. Taking this into account, Takahashi et al. [15] proposed the SPRTbased fusion scheme, which is an extension of the LR-based fusion scheme to a sequential fusion scenario where the system verifies a user each time he/she inputs a query sample. The SPRT [29] , [30] is a statistical hypothesis test that minimizes the average number of observations among all tests with the same error probabilities. Since the SPRT-based fusion scheme applies SPRT to biometric verification, it is optimal in the sense that it can minimize the average number of biometric inputs among all sequential fusion schemes with the same verification accuracy.
We now explain the SPRT-based fusion scheme in details. This scheme computes a total LLR each time the user inputs his/her query sample. Let z (m) a total LLR after the user inputs the m-th query sample, which is given by
Under the assumptions (i) and (ii) in Sect. 1.3, the total LLR after the m-th input z (m) can be expressed as follows:
The SPRT-based fusion scheme verifies the user by comparing z (m) with a threshold z th (> 0) as follows: if z (m) ≥ z th , accept; otherwise, require another input (if m = M, reject) † . The right side of Fig. 1 shows an example of the SPRT-based fusion scheme (M = 3, z th = 20).
The SPRT-based fusion scheme can also handle users who cannot appropriately input his/her query samples for some modalities by allowing them to select the order of inputs (e.g. face → fingerprint → voice). In this paper, we refer to such a mode as an input-order selection mode. For example, suppose that Alice attempts authentication against a multibiometric system that combines face, fingerprint, and voice (M = 3) using the SPRT-based fusion scheme, but cannot appropriately input her voice (because she has a sore throat or she is a goat for voice). If the system operates in the input-order selection mode, she will input her face (or fingerprint) at the 1st input, and her fingerprint (or face) at the 2nd input. By so doing, she can attempt authentication without inputting her voice (if she is not accepted after the 2nd input, she will give up). In fact, the total LLR after the 2nd input z (2) is equal to the total LLR z (sel) in the modality selection mode (see Sect. 2.2) when she inputs only her face and fingerprint (i.e.
). In other words, the input-order selection mode handles missing query samples by setting the corresponding LLRs to 0, as well as the modality selection mode.
Other Studies on LR-Based Fusion and SPRT-Based Fusion
Since Nandakumar et al. [6] proposed the LR-based fusion scheme, various studies have been made on this scheme. For example, Nandakumar et al. [9] extended the LR-based fusion scheme to an identification scenario, in which the system identifies the user by comparing a query sample with all templates in the database (i.e. one-to-many matching). In [18] , they also showed that the assumptions (i) and (ii) in the LR-based fusion scheme do not adversely affect the verification accuracy even in the case of multiple matchers, when each matcher is accurate and the difference between the genuine correlation and the impostor correlation is small. Poh and Kittler [19] proposed a general framework for qualitybased fusion that includes the LR-based fusion scheme as a special case. Tao and Velduis [20] proposed a method to directly estimate a LLR via the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) curve. Many studies have also been made on the SPRT-based fusion scheme proposed by Takahashi et al. [15] . For example, Allano et al. [24] evaluated the LR-based fusion scheme in terms of the cost that includes the authentication time and † More strictly speaking, the SPRT-based fusion scheme com- the financial cost of sensors. Murakami et al. [25] extended this scheme to the identification scenario. In [26] , they also proposed a variant of the SPRT-based fusion scheme that has security against wolves and lambs (claimants and enrollees who can cause false accepts against many others).
Some studies [21] , [22] considered spoofing attacks against the LR-based fusion scheme. More specifically, they showed that the impostor can significantly increase FAR in the LR-based fusion scheme if he/she can perfectly spoof one of the modalities (i.e. if he/she can input an artifact [31] that perfectly imitates the target user's biometrics). Ohki and Otsuka [23] proposed a different type of spoofing attack, called the wolf attack, against the biometric verification system that computes a LLR based on biometric features (not based on scores). In their attack, the impostor inputs an artifact that causes false accepts against many others. The modality selection attack, which is proposed in Sect. 4, is totally different from these spoofing attacks in the following two points: (1) the impostor inputs not artifacts but his/her own biometric samples, which cannot be blocked using liveness detection [31] ; (2) he/she inputs only query samples whose LLRs are more than 0 to maximize FAR.
Password Entropy and Performance Metrics in Biometrics
Before introducing our proposal, we review how to measure the "overall" accuracy in biometrics. The DET (Detection Error Tradeoff) curve [14] , which can be obtained by plotting FAR against FRR at various thresholds (i.e. FAR-FRR curve), is one of the most popular metrics to measure the overall accuracy. However, it is difficult to compare biometrics with other authentication factors such as passwords and PINs (Personal Identification Numbers) using the DET curve. Taking this into account, Takahashi and Murakami [10] , [11] proposed the BSE (Biometric System Entropy), which is a performance metric in biometrics that can be compared with password entropy [12] , [13] . Since the BSE is hard to compute in reality, they also proposed to use the KL (Kullback-Leibler) divergence between a genuine score distribution and an impostor's one as an approximation of the BSE. We explain password entropy, the BSE, and the KL divergence in Sects. 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, respectively.
Password Entropy
Password entropy [12] , [13] is a widely-used metric to measure the strength of passwords (or PINs). We explain password entropy based on the explanation in [11] . Let Ω be a countable set of the population that may be all human beings, and U = {u n |1 ≤ n ≤ N } ⊂ Ω be a set of people who can use a certain application (e.g. access control system), where u n is a person whose identity is n. Let further U ∈ U be a random variable that represents a user, A be a countable set of some (discrete) personally identifiable information such as passwords and PINs, and A ∈ A be a random variable that represents personally identifiable information.
Then, we can use the mutual information I (U; A), which represents the average decrease in uncertainty about the identity of a user U due to an observation of personally identifiable information A, as a measure of the identification performance of A:
where H (U) is the entropy of U. The mutual information I (U; A) can also be written as follows:
A password or PIN A is uniquely determined given a user u n (e.g. 4-digit PIN of u 1 is "5208"). In this case, since the conditional entropy H ( A|U) is always 0, it follows from (11)
is exactly what is called password entropy [12] , [13] . In other words, password entropy is a special case of the performance metric using the mutual information I (U; A) (where H ( A|U) = 0). For example, password entropy of randomly chosen 4-digit PIN can be simply computed as I (U; A) = H ( A) = log 10 4 = 13.3 bits. Since users tend to choose 4-digit PINs non-uniformly (e.g. many users choose "1234"), password entropy of user-chosen 4-digit PINs are less than 13.3 bits in reality. For example, it is estimated to be 9 bits in [12] .
BSE (Biometric System Entropy)
The BSE (Biometric System Entropy) [10] , [11] is a performance metric in biometrics that is designed to be compared with password entropy. We begin with explaining the BSE in the case of unimodal biometric authentication, in which the system uses a single modality and single instance. Let B a biometric feature space, and t n ∈ B be a template of the user u n ∈ U. Suppose that a user U ∈ U inputs a query sample q ∈ B at the authentication phase (U is a random variable). Note that q itself does not tell us who U is (i.e. we have to compare q with t n of each u n ∈ U to know who U is). Also, it is preferable that a performance metric can be applied to any kind of biometric system, irrespective of feature representation and matching algorithms. Taking these issues into accounts, Takahashi and Murakami [10] , [11] assumed the biometric matching system S as a black box system that takes the query sample q and the template u n as input, and outputs a score x n ∈ X:
They used a set of scores
for all users u 1 , · · · , u N as personally identifiable information, and defined the BSE as the mutual information I (U; X), where X is a random variable whose realization is x. Since It takes a query sample q = {q (1) , q (2) } and a template t n = {t
n } as input, and outputs an integrated score
the BSE is the mutual information between a user and personally identifiable information (as well as password entropy), it can be compared with password entropy. Also, it can be applied to any kind of biometric system that outputs scores.
The BSE can also be applied to the multibiometric authentication system. Suppose that the system uses M modalities (or instances). Let S (m) , q (m) ∈ B, t (m) n ∈ B be a biometric matching system (subsystem), a query sample, and a template at the m-th modality, respectively (1 ≤ m ≤ M).
Let further x (m) n ∈ X be a score between q (m) and t
n ) be an integrated score (F is a score level fusion function). Then we can use the mutual information I (U; X) as the BSE, as well as the unimodal case. Figure 2 shows the construction of the multibiometric matching system S (M = 2).
KL (Kullback-Leibler) Divergence
It is hard to compute the mutual information I (U; X) (i.e. BSE) in reality, especially when the number of users N is very large. Thus, Takahashi and Murakami [10] , [11] proposed to use the KL (Kullback-Leibler) divergence between a genuine score distribution and an impostor's one as an approximation of the BSE.
Let f gen (resp. f imp ) be a genuine distribution (resp. impostor distribution) of scores x output by the biometric matching system S. Then, the KL divergence between these distributions D( f gen ∥ f imp ) is defined as follows [32] :
Takahashi and Murakami [10] , [11] proved that the BSE I (U; X) converges to the KL divergence D( f gen ∥ f imp ) as the number of users N increases:
Lemma 1 (BSE and KL divergence) [10] , [11] :
This lemma means that the KL divergence D( f gen ∥ f imp ) can be used as an approximation of the BSE I (U; X). The KL divergence D( f gen ∥ f imp ) can be estimated using the histogram-based estimator [33] or the generalized k-NN (Nearest Neighbor) estimator [16] . Sutcu et al. [34] also proposed to use the KL divergence D( f gen ∥ f imp ) as a performance metric in biometrics. They did not mention, however, the relationship between the KL divergence and password entropy via the mutual information.
Modality Selection Attacks
In this section, we propose a new spoofing attack called the modality selection attack. We firstly propose a modality selection attack against the LR-based fusion scheme with the modality selection mode in Sect. 4.1. We secondly show that this attack can also be applied to the SPRT-based fusion scheme with the input-order selection mode in Sect. 4.2. We finally show that in some cases, the impostor can perform this attack without background knowledge about the target user's biometrics in Sect. 4.3.
Modality Selection Attacks against LR-Based Fusion
We propose a modality selection attack against the LR-based fusion scheme with the modality selection mode, which is described in Sect. 2.2. In this attack, the impostor (attacker) does not input artifacts but inputs his/her own query samples. Thus, this attack is very simple, but is very powerful in the sense that it cannot be blocked using liveness detection [31] . The impostor does not input all query samples, but inputs only query samples whose LLRs against the target user are more than 0. The impostor can find such vulnerable modalities (in which LLRs will be more than 0) by using some background knowledge about the target user's biometrics. For example, many people open a part of their own biometric information (e.g. face image, voice) to the public. A residual fingerprint may also be found on a sensor surface, glass, or anywhere else. After obtaining the background knowledge, the impostor performs offline analysis. Specifically, the impostor compares his/her own biometrics with the target user's biometrics by running a matching system that outputs a score (or LLR) offline, and guesses whether a LLR output by the target system will be more than 0 or not. It should be noted that the algorithm and parameters of the target system is generally unknown. However, we can assume that the score (or LLR) in offline analysis is highly correlated with the LLR output by the target system. By this means, the impostor can find modalities in which LLRs will be more than 0. In Sect. 4.3, we also describe how to find such vulnerable modalities when the impostor cannot obtain the background knowledge for some modalities.
Suppose that the impostor succeeded in inputting only query samples whose LLRs against the target user are more than 0. Let M (opt) ⊆ {1, · · · , M } be a set of modality indexes whose LLRs are more than 0, and z (opt) be a total LLR after observing the corresponding query samples. Under the assumptions (i) and (ii) in Sect. 1.3, z (opt) can be expressed as follows:
There are 2 M possible ways of selecting modalities in the modality selection mode. Among them, z (opt) achieves the maximum value of z (sel) in (6). Thus, the modality selection attack is optimal in the sense that it maximizes FAR among 2 M possible combinations of modalities. The upper side and the lower left-hand side of Fig. 3 show an example of the modality selection attack against the LR-based fusion scheme with the modality selection mode (M = 4, z th = 8). In our experiments in Sect. 6, we show that this attack can increase FAR by about 100 times, compared to the case when the impostor always inputs all query samples.
Modality Selection Attacks against SPRT-Based Fusion
The modality selection attack can also be applied to the SPRT-based fusion scheme with the input-order selection mode, which is described in Sect. 2.3. Also in this case, the impostor inputs only query samples whose LLRs are more than 0 (he/she can select any input-order for these query samples). If the impostor is accepted until he/she inputs all of them, his/her attack results in success. Otherwise, the impostor gives up impersonation. The upper side and the lower right-hand side of Fig. 3 show an example of this attack. Since the impostor knows that a LLR will be more than 0 in face and voice in this example, he/she inputs face (or voice) at the 1st input, and voice (or face) at the 2nd input. In this example, the impostor is accepted after the 2nd input, since the LLRs for face and voice are 4 and 6, respectively, and z (2) = 4 + 6 = 10 > 8 (= z th ). The total LLR z (m) achieves the maximum value if the impostor inputs all of the query samples whose LLRs Fig. 3 Example of the modality selection attack against LR-based fusion and SPRT-based fusion (M = 4, z t h = 8). By offline analysis, the impostor finds that a LLR will be more than 0 in face and voice, and less than 0 in fingerprints. Thus, in LR-based fusion, the impostor does not input fingerprints (marked with crosses) but inputs only face and voice (marked with circles). In SPRT-based fusion (z t h = 8), the impostor inputs face (or voice) at the 1st input, and voice (or face) at the 2nd input. Since the LLRs for face and voice are 4 and 6, respectively, z (o p t ) = z (2) = 10 (= 4 + 6).
are more than 0. Thus, this attack is optimal in the sense that it maximizes FAR among all possible ways (M! ways) to select the input-order.
It should be noted that the modality selection attack maximizes the total LLR for both the LR-based fusion scheme and the SPRT-based fusion scheme, and these maximum values are always the same (e.g. z (opt) = z (2) = 10 (= 4 + 6) in Fig. 3) . Thus, FAR in the LR-based fusion scheme is equal to FAR in the SPRT-based fusion scheme (for the same threshold z th ) in this case. Similarly, when genuine users input only query samples whose LLRs are more than 0 (they know such modalities as described in Sect. 1), FRR in the LR-based fusion scheme is equal to FRR in the SPRT-based fusion scheme. Thus, these schemes have the same DET curve (i.e. FAR-FRR curve) in this optimal setting.
Modality Selection Attacks without Background
Knowledge about Biometrics
In reality, it may be hard for the impostor to obtain background knowledge about the target user's biometrics. In particular, it is extremely hard (or impossible) to obtain background knowledge for some modalities such as iris, vein, and retina. However, even if the impostor cannot obtain background knowledge for some modalities, he/she can perform the modality selection attack (i.e. he/she can find the optimal combinations of modalities that maximizes the total LLR z (opt) (or z (m) )) in some cases. For example, the impostor can perform the modality selection attack by attempting some promising combinations of modalities. Suppose that the system uses the LR-based fusion scheme that combines face, voice, fingerprint, and iris (M = 4; there are 2 4 = 16 possible combinations of modalities), and adopts a policy to block a user's account after 3 failed attempts. The impostor is confident that a LLR will be more than 0 in voice, and less than 0 in face and fingerprint. The impostor does not know about iris, since he/she does not obtain background knowledge for iris. In this case, the impostor will attempt two promising combinations: {voice}, {voice, iris}. Then he/she can find the optimal combination of modalities before the account is blocked.
The impostor may also find a combination of modalities that is optimal in almost all cases, when the system uses the modalities with very high accuracy (e.g. iris, vein) along with the modalities with relatively low accuracy (e.g. face, voice). Suppose that the system uses the LR-based fusion scheme that combines face, voice, iris, and vein (M = 4; there are 2 4 = 16 possible combinations of modalities), and blocks a user's account after 3 failed attempts. The impostor is confident that a LLR will be less than 0 in iris and vein in almost all cases, since the system is generally very accurate in these modalities. Thus, the impostor will attempt three promising combinations: {face}, {voice}, {face, voice}, one of which is optimal in almost all cases. Note that the impostor does not use any background knowledge in this case.
These examples show that the modality selection attack can be a realistic threat, even if the impostor does not obtain background knowledge about the target user's biometrics.
Theoretical Evaluation
In the modality selection attack, impostors input only query samples whose LLRs are more than 0 to maximize FAR. It should be noted, however, that genuine users can also input only such query samples to maximize GAR (= 1− FRR). They know such modalities because they know their temporary physical conditions (e.g. injuries, illness), or because they know from experience that some modalities tend to cause false rejection. If both genuine users and impostors take this optimal strategy in the LR-based fusion scheme, both GAR and FAR will increase, compared to the case when they input all query samples (i.e. when the system does not operate in the modality selection mode). Then, what happens to the "overall" accuracy? We show that it will become "worse" by proving the KL divergence, which is described in Sect. 3.3, will become smaller. Note that in this section, we analyze not the SPRT-based fusion scheme but the LR-based fusion scheme, because these schemes have the same DET curve when both genuine users and impostors take the optimal strategy, as described in Sect. 4.2 (similarly, they have the same KL divergence in this case). We now provide theoretical evaluation of the LR-based fusion scheme. Here we consider two cases: (I) the system does not operate in the modality selection mode (i.e. users input all query samples); (II) the system operates in the modality selection mode, and both genuine users and impostors take the optimal strategy (i.e. they input only query samples whose LLRs are more than 0).
Suppose, in the same way as Sect. 3.2, that a biometric matching system S (m) outputs a score x (m) ∈ X at the mth modality (or instance), and a multibiometric matching system S uses S (m) as a subsystem (1 ≤ m ≤ M). We define the following three functions:
1 : function that takes a score x (m) ∈ X as input, and outputs a LLR y (m) (= log f
2 : function that takes a LLR y (m) ∈ R as input, and outputs y * (m) = max( y (m) , 0).
as input, and outputs a summation b = ∑ M m=1 a (m) . The LR-based fusion scheme without the modality selection mode (i.e. case (I)) can be regarded as a scheme that computes a LLR at the m-th modality y (m) from a score x (m) using F It takes a query sample q = {q (1) , q (2) } and a template t = {t (1) , t (2) } as input, and outputs z (t ot ) in (5) as an integrated score. gen , h gen , g * (m)
gen , and h * gen (resp. g
imp , and h * imp ) (1 ≤ m ≤ M) be a genuine (resp. impostor) distribution of LLRs at the m-th modality y (m) , total LLRs 
and the following inequality holds for integrated scores (i.e. z (tot) , z (opt) ):
The loss of the KL divergence at the m-th modality (or instance) is given by the following quantity:
where
imp ( y (m) ).
We provide a detailed proof in Appendix. The quantity in (19) is the KL-divergence loss due to adopting the modality selection mode. This quantity is computed from a genuine/impostor distribution of LLRs at the m-th modality
imp ) using (20), (21), and (22).
Experimental Evaluation

Experimental Set-Up
We conducted experiments to evaluate the impact of the modality selection attack on accuracy. We used the NIST BSSR1 Set 2 and Set 3 datasets [17] , because they contain a very large number of subjects (6000 and 3000 subjects in Set 2 and Set 3, respectively). More specifically, we used the generalized k-NN (Nearest Neighbor) estimator [16] to estimate the KL divergence in our experiments, since the estimate converges to the true value as the sample size increases. However, this estimate needs a large number of samples (i.e. a large number of subjects) to converge to the true value. Thus, we used the NIST BSSR1 Set 2 and Set 3 datasets, each of which is one of the largest publicly available datasets. We show that the estimate indeed converges as the sample size (i.e. the number of subjects) increases. The NIST BSSR1 Set 2 dataset contains left index fingerprint scores and right index fingerprint scores from 6000 subjects. The NIST BSSR1 Set 3 dataset contains face scores from 3000 subjects. Although there were face scores from two matching algorithms ("C" and "G"), we used those from "C" and excluded 8 person who have inappropriate scores (the values "−1"). We randomly extracted 2992 subjects from the 6000 subjects in the NIST BSSR1 Set 2 dataset, and combined these two datasets (3 × 2992 × 2992 scores in total). In other words, we created a virtual multibiometric dataset, as well as [35] , [36] . One might think that in a real multimodal dataset, some correlation could be appear between fingerprints and a face in the same person. However, as described in Sect. 6.2 in details, we show that the results of this paper are consistent with the results of the previous conference paper [1] , in which we used the NIST BSSR Set 1 dataset [17] (a real multimodal dataset that contains left index fingerprint scores, right index fingerprint scores, and face scores from 517 subjects). We randomly divided the 2992 subjects into 192 subjects for training and 2800 subjects for evaluation. Here we attempted 20 ways to randomly divide the 2992 subjects, and conducted the following experiments for each case.
In our experiments, we evaluated the LR-based fusion scheme in the following two cases:
• All: The LR-based fusion scheme without the modality selection mode. Both genuine users and impostors input all query samples in this case.
• Optimal: The LR-based fusion scheme with the modality selection mode. Both genuine users and impostors take the optimal strategy in this case (they input only query samples whose LLRs are more than 0).
We used logistic regression that estimates a LLR at the mth modality y (m) as a linear function of a score x (m) (i.e.
0 , where w As an estimation method, we used the bias-reduced maximum likelihood estimation method [37] .
We then evaluated the performance of All and Optimal using the 2800 subjects for evaluation (2800 genuine attempts and 2800 × 2799 impostor attempts in total). Here we used FAR, FRR, the DET curve, and the KL divergence in (18) 
) using integrated scores from 2800 genuine attempts and 2800 × 2799 impostor attempts. Here we used the generalized k-NN estimator [16] as an estimation method (as described above). We also evaluated the KL-divergence loss in (19) using 2800 genuine LLRs y (m) and 2800 × 2799 impostor LLRs y (m) (1 ≤ m ≤ 3). Specifically, we computed a genuine/impostor frequency distribution of LLRs (i.e. g imp ) from these LLRs, and estimated the KL-divergence loss using (20) , (21) , and (22) . We took an average of FAR, FRR, the KL divergence, and the KL-divergence loss over all the 20 ways to randomly divide the 2992 subjects to obtain a stable performance.
Note that we did not evaluate the SPRT-based fusion scheme here (as well as Sect. 5), because it has the same DET curve and the KL divergence with the LR-based fusion scheme when both genuine users and impostors take the optimal strategy.
Experimental Results
First of all, we computed a frequency distribution of genuine/impostor scores (i.e. f imp (x (m) )) using all scores (2992 genuine scores and 2992 × 2991 impostor scores) for each modality (1 ≤ m ≤ 3) . Figure 6 shows the results. It can be seen that there is a close-to-linear relationship between a score x (m) and a LLR y (m) , which indicates that the logistic regression model is valid for these datasets.
We then evaluated the performance of the LR-based fusion scheme (i.e. All and Optimal). Figure 7 shows the relationship between the threshold z th and FAR/FRR. It can be seen that FAR of Optimal is about 100 times higher than that of All at the same threshold z th . This indicates a threat of the modality selection attack; we should not assume that impostors input all query samples when we set the threshold z th in the modality selection mode. It can also be seen that FRR of Optimal is lower than that of All as expected. Figure 8 shows the DET curve (i.e. FAR-FRR curve). The DET curve of Optimal is "worse" than that of All.
Thus we can expect that the KL divergence of Optimal is also smaller. ∥ h imp ) . It can also be seen that the estimate of the KL-divergence loss is 0.067 bits, 0.113 bits, 0.103 bits for face, left fingerprint, and right fingerprint, respectively, which is roughly consistent with the estimate of the total KL-divergence loss (about 0.25 bits). We also show in this table password entropy of user-chosen 16 or 17-digit PINs that is estimated in [12] . For example, we can say that integrated scores output by the LR-based fusion scheme without the modality selection mode have a discriminative power close to that of 17-digit PINs (i.e. 21.874 ≈ 22). Although they become less discriminative by adopting the modality selection mode, they are still more discriminative than 16-digit PINs (i.e. 21.626 > 21).
Finally, we computed the estimate of the KL divergence D(h gen ∥ h imp ) and the total KL-divergence loss
, while changing the number of subjects for evaluation to 10, 100, 200, 300, · · · , 2700, or 2800. For example, when the number of subjects was 100, we estimated the KL divergence (i.e. D(h gen ∥ h imp ), D(h * gen ∥ h * imp )) using integrated scores from 100 genuine attempts and 100×99 impostor attempts. Figure 9 and Fig. 10 show the results. It can be seen that the estimate of the KL divergence D(h gen ∥ h imp ) and the total KL-divergence loss
converges to about 22 bits and 0.25 bits, respectively. This is consistent with the fact that the estimate by the generalized k-NN estimator [16] converges to the true value as the sample size increases.
It should be noted again that we used a virtual multibiometric dataset (i.e. we used the NIST BSSR1 Set 2 and Set 3 datasets) in our experiments. In the previous conference paper [1] , we used the NIST BSSR1 Set 1 dataset, which is Fig. 9 Relationship between the number of subjects and the estimate of the KL divergence D(h gen ∥ h i m p ).
Fig. 10
Relationship between the number of subjects and the estimate of the total KL-divergence loss
a real multimodal dataset that contains left index fingerprint scores, right index fingerprint scores, and face scores from 517 subjects. In [1] , we randomly chose 400 subjects for evaluation, and conducted experiments similar to the ones in this paper. As a result, we obtained in [1] the relationship between the threshold z th and FAR/FRR, which was similar to Fig. 7 (i.e. FAR/FRR of Optimal was higher/lower than that of All). We also obtained in [1] the DET curve, which was similar to Fig. 8 (i.e. the DET curve of Optimal was "worse" than that of All). We further obtained in [1] the KL divergence and the KL-divergence loss, which were consistent with Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 . Specifically, in [1] , the KL divergences D(h gen ∥ h imp ) and D(h * gen ∥ h * imp ) were 16.75 bits and 17.03 bits, respectively, and therefore the KLdivergence loss was 0.28 bits. It can be seen from Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 that when we set the number of subjects to be 400 (as in [1] ), the KL divergence D(h gen ∥ h imp ) and the KL-divergence loss are 16.85 bits and 0.28 bits, respectively, which are very close to the values in [1] . Thus, we can say that the results of this paper are consistent with the results of [1] , in which we used a real multimodal dataset. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that fingerprints and a face of the same person are highly independent of each other.
Discussions on Multibiometric Applications
In our experiments in Sect. 6, we showed that the overall accuracy (in terms of the DET curve and the KL divergence) becomes worse by introducing the modality selection mode in the LR-based fusion scheme. In other fusion schemes (e.g. the sum rule [38] , the max rule [39] ), combining a weak modality might degrade the overall accuracy (and hence, the modality selection mode might increase the overall accuracy). However, since the LR-based fusion scheme has an optimal property with regard to the overall accuracy (as described in Sect. 1), we focus on the LR-based fusion scheme and its extension to a sequential fusion scenario (i.e. the SPRT-based fusion scheme) and discuss directions of multibiometric applications based on these schemes using the experimental results in Sect. 6.
As described in Sect. 1, the properties of the LR-based fusion scheme can be summarized as follows:
1. Optimality with regard to accuracy: The NeymanPearson lemma [7] guarantees that FAR is minimized for a given FRR (if a user inputs all query samples). 2. Capability of modality selection (usability): A user can select modalities in which he/she inputs query samples at the authentication phase.
Note that the LR-based fusion scheme cannot satisfy the above properties simultaneously. We showed, both theoretically and experimentally, that the overall accuracy becomes worse by introducing the modality selection mode. However, it is important to note that the KL divergence in Optimal (= 21.626) is close to the KL divergence in All (= 21.874) in our experiments in Sect. 6. This means that the LR-based fusion scheme with the modality selection mode can provide a "close-to-optimal" accuracy. In other words, it almost satisfies the above two properties. We now turn our attention to the SPRT-based fusion scheme, which has the following property (as described in Sect. 2.3):
3. Optimality with regard to the number of biometric inputs (usability): The average number of biometric inputs can be minimized (among all sequential fusion schemes with the same verification accuracy).
We also explained in Sect. 4.2 that the SPRT-based fusion scheme with the input-order selection mode has the same overall accuracy as the LR-based fusion scheme with the modality selection mode (when both genuine users and impostors take the optimal strategy). Thus, the SPRT-based fusion scheme with the input-order selection mode provides (1) a "close-to-optimal" accuracy, (2) a capability of modality (input-order) selection, and (3) an optimality with regard to the number of biometric inputs. In other words, it almost satisfies the above three properties. We consider that the second property (i.e. capability of modality selection) is very important in real multibiometric applications, since it is helpful for users who suffer from adverse physical conditions (e.g. injuries, illness), or those who are "goats" for some modalities. Also, since the goal of multibiometric fusion is generally to provide (not an optimal accuracy but) a satisfactory level of accuracy, a "close-to-optimal" accuracy could be sufficient in many real multibiometric applications. Thus, we consider that after all, the LR-based fusion scheme with the modality selection mode and the SPRT-based fusion scheme with the input-order selection mode are very promising approaches to combining multiple sources of biometric information.
Another direction of the LR-based (or the SPRT-based) multibiometric application is to disable "goat" modalities, whose LLRs tend to be less than 0 for genuine users. For example, suppose a multibiometric system that combines fingerprint and voice (M = 2) using the LR-based fusion scheme with the modality selection mode. Alice knows from experience that she is a goat for voice. Then, she asks a system operator to delete her voice template (i.e. disable a voice modality). We note that this might sacrifice the second property (capability of modality selection) to some extent, because Alice cannot select a voice modality again. For example, when Alice gets her finger injured, she might not be able to input her fiingerprint nor her voice (i.e. she should not have disabled a voice modality in this case, even if she is a goat for voice). However, disabling a voice modality might also mitigate the impact of the modality selection attack, because the impostor (attacker), whose LLR is more than 0 for Alice's voice template, cannot input voice (i.e. he/she cannot take an optimal strategy anymore). In other words, disabling goat modalities might decrease FAR (and hence, increase the overall accuracy) at the expense of the second property (capability of modality selection) to some extent. As future work, we also plan to investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, the impact of disabling goat modalities on FAR and the overall accuracy.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed the modality selection attack, which inputs only query samples whose LLRs are more than 0 to maximize FAR, against the LR-based fusion scheme and the SPRT-based fusion scheme. We showed that this attack increased FAR by about 100 times in the experiments (which means that we should not assume that impostors input all query samples when we set a threshold z th in the modality selection mode or the input-order selection mode). We then showed, both theoretically and experimentally, that it degrades the "overall" accuracy even if genuine users also take the optimal strategy to maximize GAR. We also showed to what extent the overall accuracy losses (i.e. the KL-divergence loss), and discussed directions of multibiometric applications based on the experimental results.
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